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Professional Sports League Commissioners'
Authority and Collective Bargaining
MATTHEW J. PARLOW*
ABSTRACT
With the National Basketball Association (NBA) and National Football League (NFL)
collective bargaining agreements set to expire within the next two years, many experts are
already predicting what changes may be made to both leagues'governing labor
documents. One likely point of contention between the owners and the players' unions-
though rarely discussed in the experts 'predictive discourse-is the power of the respective
league commissioners to punish or discipline wayward players for misbehavior committed
off of the court or field. This article will analyze this area of sports law by exploring this
power of each league's sports commissioner, as well as its place and significance in
collective bargaining.
This article will begin in Part 11 by giving a brief overview of the rise in commissioner
discipline for players' misbehavior committed off of the court or field and why
commissioners punish in this manner. Parts 11 and 111 will track and situate the source of
the commissioners 'power to discipline for such reasons-namely, in the leagues'
respective collective bargaining agreements. Part IV will describe how courts and
arbitrators have treated commissioners'decisions to punish players for their actions off of
the court or field, and posit why such treatment is a concern for the labor unions
representing professional athletes in these two leagues. Part IV will then give an overview
of the collective bargaining process and the effect it has on this power of each league
commissioner. Part IV will also explore why the players' unions will likely make this power
of the league commissioner a provision of the collective bargaining agreement that will be
negotiated over, unlike in years past. Finally, Part V will provide some concluding insights.
" Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Loyola Marymount
University. I would like to thank Professor Janine Kim for her comments on an earlier draft of this article; Ben
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me to speak at their symposium entitled "The Implications of the Expiring Collective Bargaining Agreements in
the NFL and NBA," as well for their research and editing assistance; Alex Porteshawver and Ashley Wilson for
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)-the union that
represents professional football players in the National Football League (NFL)-has
thrown down the gauntlet for its upcoming renegotiation of its collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the NFL.1 The National Basketball Players Association (NBPA)-
the union that represents professional basketball players in the National Basketball
Association (NBA)-may follow suit. Many are predicting that traditional substantive
terms of each of the league's respective CBA will be the focal points that determine
whether labor peace can be achieved: salary cap,2 revenue sharing,3 and others. However,
one area of the CBA negotiations for the NBA and the NFL that has received little
attention, but that may prove integral to the success of these negotiations, is the power of
the respective league's commissioners to discipline wayward athletes for misbehavior
1. See Goodell's Authority To Be Part of Talks, ESPN.cOM, July 28, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id--4360661 (quoting NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith
discussing his union's intention to negotiate over the NFL Commissioner's power to discipline athletes in the new
CBA).
2. See, e.g., Ken Berger, Owners Share Grim Figures with Players as CBA Negotiations Begin,
CBSSPORTS.COM, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/12022364 (discussing the drop in league-
wide revenue, the resulting reduction in the NBA salary cap, and the implications for the renegotiation of the
CBA).
3. See, e.g., Barry Wilner, NFLPA Challenges League Cutting Portion of Revenue Sharing, STAR TRiB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/templates/PrintThis_.Story?sid=79912472 (noting the
NFLPA's challenge to the NFL elimination of a supplemental revenue-sharing program between the NFL teams).
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committed off of the court or field. This article will analyze this unique area of sports law
by exploring the power of each leagues' commissioner and its place in collective
bargaining.
This article will begin by giving a brief overview of the rise of commissioner
discipline as a consequence of players' misbehavior committed off the court or field, and
explore why commissioners punish in this manner. Parts II and III will track and situate the
source of the commissioners' power to discipline for such reasons-namely, in the leagues'
respective CBAs. Part IV will describe how courts and arbitrators have treated
commissioners' decisions to punish players for their actions off the court or field and posit
why such treatment is a concern for the labor unions representing professional athletes in
these two leagues. Part IV will then give an overview of the collective bargaining process
and the effect it has on this power of each league's commissioner. Part IV will also explore
why the players' unions will likely make this power of the league commissioner a term of
the CBA that will be more heavily negotiated over, unlike in years past. Finally, Part V will
provide some concluding insights.
II. THE RISE OF COMMISSIONER PUNISHMENT AND THE REASONS BEHIND IT
In the past decade, professional sports have seen an increase in the discipline doled
out by professional sports league commissioners 4 to players who act inappropriately off the
court or field.5 Some misbehavior has been criminal in nature, such as Michael Vick's
involvement in dogfighting and gambling,6 Plaxico Burress's unlawful carrying and
discharging of a firearm,7 or Gilbert Arenas's possessing and drawing a gun on teammate
Javaris Crittenton in the Washington Wizards locker room. 8 However, commissioners have
also suspended players for actions which were not criminal, but instead brought disrepute
and embarrassment to the league-actions which run counter to the best interest of the
sport. 9 A quintessential example of this type of discipline occurred when Major League
4. Hereafter, when I refer to "commissioners," I will be referring to professional sports league commissioners
for the NBA, NFL, Major League Baseball (MLB), and National Hockey League (NHL).
5. Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports Leagues and Private Punishment,
99 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 574 (2009).
6. Vick Suspended Indefinitely After Filing Plea, NFL.COM, Aug. 25, 2007,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d801 cl 644&template-without-video&confirn--true; see also Mark
Maske, Falcons' Vick Indicted in Dogfighting Case, WASH. POST, July 18, 2007, at El, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071701393.html (detailing the 19-
page indictment against Vick alleging that he was involved in the dogfighting operation, attended and gambled on
fights, and participated in the execution of under-performing dogs).
7. Burress Pleads Guilty on Felony Charge, ESPN.cOM, Aug. 21, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4411373 (commenting on Burress's suspension by NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell after Burress's guilty plea to one count of attempted criminal possession of a
weapon, after being charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon and one count of reckless
endangerment).
8. Arenas Suspended Indefinitely, ESPN.coM, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4802267 (describing NBA Commissioner David Stem's indefmite
suspension of Arenas because of Arenas's behavior both in the locker room and afterward).
9. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 5, at 582-83.
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Baseball (MLB) Commissioner Bud Selig suspended then-Atlanta Braves pitcher John
Rocker for making racially-insensitive statements to a Sports Illustrated reporter. 10
This recent increase of commissioner-imposed discipline demonstrates a broadening
of the types of players' behavior which have been deemed appropriate for commissioner
punishment. In the past, commissioners handed down discipline for players' misbehavior
on the court or field or in relation to drug testing. However, this more recent phenomenon
provides a more expansive purview of punishable behavior. While this shift may be in
application only, as opposed to legal right-which the commissioners have always had-it
is, nonetheless, noteworthy.
This change should not be altogether unsurprising. In 2000, NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue acknowledged that criminal behavior by players off the field had become an
important area for reform in the NFL." Indeed, commissioners have many legitimate
reasons for disciplining athletes for their actions off the court or field. Economic realities
provide one such justification. Players' misbehavior can affect a professional sports
league's-or one of its team's-image and profitability.12 In response to inappropriate
athlete behavior, fans may attend fewer games (and thus buy less merchandise and
concessions), and corporations may cancel or choose not to renew their sponsorships of a
league or team.' 3 Accordingly, commissioners discipline wayward athletes to deter them
and other athletes from acting in such an inappropriate manner again and to send a signal to
fans and sponsors that such behavior is not tolerated by the league.
However, such punishment is not always so self-interested. Commissioners also
impose discipline on wayward athletes in an attempt to rehabilitate them. For example,
several scholars have noted the problems with professional athletes and violence against
women. 14 Many attribute this violence as an extension of the aggression and violence
required to excel on the court or field. 15 In response, commissioners punish athletes that
engage in violence against women not only to protect the reputation of their league 6-by
denunciating the behavior-but also to require players to seek counseling to help them
10. Id. Another example is MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's suspension of former MLB pitcher Denny
McLain for associating with gamblers. See William Leggett, Denny McLain: Ready for his Comeback Try, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 29, 1970, at 20, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1083763/index.htm. NBA Commissioner David Stem
also fined former Chicago Bulls player Dennis Rodman $50,000 for referring to Mormons as "assholes" in 1997.
Karen Martin Dean, Can the NBA Punish Dennis Rodman? An Analysis of First Amendment Rights in Professional
Basketball, 23 VT. L. REv. 157, 157 (1998). Stem also fined then New Jersey Nets Coach John Calipari for calling
a reporter a "Mexican idiot." See Selena Roberts, Ethnic Insult from Calipari Results in Apology by Nets, N.Y.
TIMES, March 24, 1997, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/24/sports/ethnic-insult-from-calipari-
results-in-apology-by-nets.html?pagewanted=l.
11. Sean Bukowski, Note, Flag on the Play: 25 to Lifefor the Offense of Murder, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.
106, 106-07 (2001).
12. Id. at 107.
13. Id. at 107-08.
14. See, e.g., Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 167 (1998); Carrie A. Moser, Penalties, Fouls, and Errors: Professional Athletes and Violence
Against Women, II SPORTS LAW. J. 69 (2004); Kimberly M. Trebon, There is No "7" in Team: The Commission of
Group Sexual Assault by Collegiate and Professional Athletes, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65
(2007).
15. See Dabbs, supra note 14, at 170 (explaining the view that athletes have difficulty "turning off" the
violent and aggressive traits taught by their sports); see also Moser, supra note 14, at 71 (describing the character
traits that distinguish athletes from normal citizens).
16. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 5, at 590-91 (comparing punishment in sports leagues to employment-
related punishment).
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learn from their mistakes and avoid repeating such behavior in the future.17 Finally,
commissioners have an incentive to punish misbehaving athletes because of the role model
factor. Despite former NBA star Charles Barkley's protestations, 8 professional athletes are
role models.' 9 Commissioners are mindful of the good image that professional athletes must
project for their devoted fans-particularly kids-and thus discipline athletes accordingly
to reinforce the good character required of them. 0
While commissioners may have compelling reasons for disciplining wayward athletes
for actions committed off of the court or field, the practice of doing so is somewhat
controversial. As noted above, this may be due, at least in part, to commissioner
punishment evolving solely (or largely) from instances of misbehavior committed on the
court or field to a much more expansive purview of behavior that includes actions in
athletes' private lives. The controversy may also stem from the fact that the power given the
commissioner in his league's governing documents has not been at the forefront of
negotiations between the players' labor unions and the leagues. Whichever it is, as the
power of the commissioner to discipline begins to emerge as an important term in collective
bargaining, it is helpful to trace the history of this power and understand its evolution.
III. THE BEST INTEREST CLAUSE AND THE POWER OF THE COMMISSIONER
A. Origins of the Best Interest Clause
The first commissioner of a major professional sports league 21 arose out of a
controversy that threatened the integrity-and perhaps the continued existence of-MLB.
The Chicago White Sox faced the Cincinnati Reds in the 1919 World Series and were
favored to win; the Reds won the series five games to three.22 Soon thereafter, details
emerged that gamblers had bribed eight players from the White Sox to throw the World
Series.23 While there had been rumors of players being involved in gambling in baseball
17. Bukowski, supra note 11, at 117; see also NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N & NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS
ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. VI, § 8 (executed July 29, 2005), available at
http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005 [hereinafter NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT] (requiring players who
commit violent acts off the court to possibly undergo counseling, after a clinical evaluation, to address such
behavior).
18. See Korin Miller, Charles Barkley Arrested on Suspicion ofDUI, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, available at Dec.
31, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.corm/gossip/2008/12/31/2008-12-
3 1_charlesjbarkley-arrestedon suspicion of.html (referring to Barkley's famous quote "A million guys can dunk
a basketball; should they be role models?", which led to Nike's 1993 "I am not a role model" advertising
campaign).
19. Holly M. Burch & Jennifer B. Murray, An Essay on Athletes as Role Models, Their Involvement in
Charities, and Considerations in Starting a Private Foundation, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 249, 250-55 (1999).
20. Kim & Parlow, supra note 5, at 585. Commissioners also require background checks and implement dress
codes to help further this role model image. Id.
21. It is generally accepted that the four major American professional sports leagues are the NBA, NFL,
NHL, and MLB.
22. See Jonathan M. Reinsdorf, The Powers of the Commissioner in Baseball, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 211, 219
(1996).
23. See Robert I. Lockwood, Note, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal Brings
Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Forefront in the NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137,
141-44 (2008).
2010
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generally, few thought it would reach the magnitude and significance of throwing a World
Series.24 The reality shook the public's confidence in baseball to its core, and the baseball
club owners acted swiftly to save baseball.
25
The owners decided to consolidate power in the hands of a newly created
Commissioner and approached Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis about the position.26
Landis was willing to accept the position, but only if he possessed unbridled authority.27
The owners needed someone of Landis's integrity and reputation to re-instill the public's
confidence in baseball.28 Consequently, the owners drafted a governing document, which
would later become the Major League Agreement, detailing the newly created position of
Commissioner and the near absolute power that the position enjoyed. 29 Landis approved the
wording of the document-both with regard to the Commissioner and more generally-and
became the first Commissioner of baseball. 3
The vast majority of the Commissioner's power stems from his "best interests"
power. 31 The Major League Agreement gave the Commissioner the authority to investigate
actions by anyone in baseball that he deemed "detrimental to the 'best interests' of
24. See Reinsdorf, supra note 22, at 219-20. The Chicago White Sox team of this era earned the nickname the
"Black Sox" due to this infamy. See Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 239, 245
(1998).
25. See Reinsdorf, supra note 22, at 220.
26. See Craig F. Arcella, Major League Baseball's Disempowered Commissioner: Judicial Ramifications of
the 1994 Restructuring, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2420, 2430 (1997). Judge Landis was a well known figure to baseball,
as he was the presiding judge in the antitrust case, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Due to Landis's efforts, the National League and Federal
League negotiated a settlement in the case. See Ted Curtis, In the Best Interests of the Game: The Authority of the
Commissioner of Major League Baseball, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 6 (1995). Interestingly, only the National
League's Baltimore franchise did not accept the settlement, and thus, the Federal League sued the Baltimore team.
This case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court's decision ultimately provided MLB with its
antitrust exemption. See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 200.
27. Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
277, 304 (2005).
28. Peter G. Neiman, "Root, Root, Root for the Home Team ": Pete Rose, Nominal Parties, and Diversity
Jurisdiction, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 148, 148 n.7 (1991). This did not, however, stop the owners from attempting to
limit the powers of the commissioner right before the final drafting session of the document that was to ultimately
become the Major League Agreement. The owners attempted to add two clauses that would have limited the
Commissioner's otherwise absolute authority. The first clause would have transformed the Commissioner's ability
to suspend or remove an owner for actions that were "detrimental to the best interests" of baseball to the mere
ability to recommend such a suspension or removal. See Reinsdorf, supra note 22, at 223. The second clause would
have limited the Commissioner's role to one of a tiebreaker for such issues brought before the Advisory
Committee, instead of being able to rule on all matters before the Committee. See id. At the final drafting session,
Landis threatened to not become commissioner when presented with the owners' proposed changes. The owners
quickly relented, and Landis became the Commissioner of baseball, endowed with absolute authority. See id.
29. See Reinsdorf, supra note 22, at 221.
30. See id.
31. See Matthew A. Foote, Three Strikes and You're (Not Necessarily) Out: How Baseball's Erratic
Approach to Conduct Violations Is Not in the Best Interest of the Game, 6 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 6-7 (2009). Interestingly, the scope of the Commissioner's power-albeit more limited at the time--can
actually be seen to have predated the official position of Commissioner. In 1919, the Boston Red Sox sold pitcher
Carl Mays to the New York Yankees after he left the field during the middle of the game-without the permission
or instruction of his manager or team. See Bukowski, supra note 11, at 109. When he caught wind of the sale of
Mays, American League President Byron "Ban" Johnson suspended Mays for leaving his team. See id. Before the
uniting of the leagues under Commissioner Landis, the American and National Leagues had their own presidents
that oversaw their respective operations. See id. The Yankees challenged Johnson's suspension in American
League Baseball Club of N. Y. v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 498 (1919), and the court held that Johnson could suspend or
otherwise discipline a player only for actions taken during the course of the actual playing of a game.
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baseball. 32 Moreover, the commissioner could take "preventative, remedial or punitive
action" against those acting against these "best interests. 33 The Commissioner also served
as the final arbiter of disputes arising in baseball-between the league and clubs, between
players and clubs, etc. 34 To ensure the absolute authority of the Commissioner, the Major
League Agreement dictated that all clubs were bound by the Commissioner's decisions and
that they waived the right to challenge such decisions in court, regardless of how severe the
penalty imposed.35 While the MLB Commissioner no longer enjoys this type of absolute
authority, 36 he still has significant power-as do the commissioners in the other major
professional sports leagues-to act in the best interest of his sport, including punishing
athletes for misbehavior committed off the court or field.
B. Sources of the Best Interest Power in the NBA and NFL
The broad power afforded professional sports league commissioners through the
leagues' respective best interest clauses stems, in large part, from the league constitutions,
bylaws, and CBAs. 37 Included in these general powers-as described further below-is the
power of each league's commissioner to discipline athletes for inappropriate actions
committed off of the court or field.38 These governing documents contractually bind most
of the individuals involved in professional sports, as the players (through their union) and
32. See Reinsdorf, supra note 22, at 221.
33. See id. The Major League Agreement allowed the Commissioner to take punitive measures, such as
imposing a $5,000 fine (not an insignificant amount in 1921) and making a player ineligible to play in the league.
See id. at 221-22.
34. See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Power of Professional Sports Commission-
ers: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409, 1415
(1990).
35. See id. Since that time, despite the waiver of the right to recourse in the judicial system, courts have
considered cases involving actions taken by the Commissioner pursuant to his best interest power, though only
when the Commissioner has exceeded his authority. See Reinsdorf, supra note 22, at 222.
36. See generally Reinsdorf, supra note 22 (detailing the various amendments to the Commissioner's power
since the adoption of the Major League Agreement); Pachman, supra note 34, at 1416-17 (detailing changes made
to the powers of the MLB Commissioner over time); Curtis, supra note 26, at 12-31.
37. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 379-80 (6th ed., LexisNexis 2006); see also
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CONST. § 2 (amended 2005) (providing the MLB Commissioner with authority to
discipline athletes who act in a way that is "not in the best interests of baseball"); NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N
CONST. & BYLAWS art. XXXV(d) (1989) [hereinafter NBA CONST. & BYLAWS] (enabling the NBA Commissioner
to discipline "any Player who, in [the Commissioner's] opinion, shall have been guilty of conduct prejudicial... or
detrimental to the [NBA]"; NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE BYLAWS § 17.3(a) (1990) (authorizing the NHL
Commissioner to punish an athlete "whether during or outside the playing season has been dishonorable,
prejudicial to or against the welfare of the League or the game of Hockey"); NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. &
BYLAWS art. VIII (amended 1999) [hereinafter NFL CONST. & BYLAWS]; NFL MGMT. COUNCIL & NFL PLAYERS
Ass'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT app. C, 15 (2006) [hereinafter NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT] (permitting the NFL Commissioner to punish an athlete who acts in a manner that is "detrimental to
the League or professional football"). The NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement grants the Commissioner power
to discipline players to protect "the integrity of the sport'"-a phrase synonymous to the "best interest of the sport."
38. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 5, at 575; see also MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND
REGULATION 436 (1 st ed. 2005) (explaining the commissioners' power to act in the best interest of their respective
sport); Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests " Disciplinary Authority
in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645 (1999) (analyzing the different professional sports leagues'
commissioners' best interest powers).
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the owners (through the league itself) negotiate and approve these documents.39 In this
regard, the interested parties in professional sports construct and bring their actions under
the purview of the power of the commissioner. As one scholar notes, the power afforded a
commissioner "represents an almost autonomous authority Within the internal structure of
the league, uncontrolled by its principal owners. 40 While MLB was the first to codify the
best interest power in the Major League Agreement, the NBA and NFL eventually followed
suit, granting their respective commissioners the broad- power contained in this type of best
interest clause.
The first NBA Commissioner did not enjoy the same broad authority that MLB
Commissioner Landis did.4' Instead, the NBA's first Commissioner,42 Maurice Podoloff,
did not have much formal power under the governing league documents.43 In 1964, shortly
after the NBA's second Commissioner took office-Walter Kennedy assumed the role in
1963-the NBPA was formed. 44 In 1971, the league owners granted the Commissioner a
type of broad-reaching best interest power similar to the power enjoyed by the MLB
Commissioner. 45 Some believe that the owners instituted the Commissioner's best interest
power to "preserve the integrity of the league from the perceived evils of gambling. 46
There were several instances of problems with gambling and basketball-including the
high-profile case, Molinas v. NBA 47 in 1961, which will be discussed below in Part IV-
that preceded the vesting of the NBA Commissioner with this best interest power. To
exercise his best interest power, the NBA Commissioner did not need a player to violate a
league rule.48 Instead, the Commissioner could use this power-based on his professional
judgment-in a way that he deemed in the best interest of the NBA, limited only by
contrary language contained in any of the league's governing documents or by due process
concerns. 
49
39. Ian Dobinson & David Thorpe, What's Wrong with the Commissioner? Some Lessons from Downunder,
19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 105, 111-12 (2009).
40. Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner and an Alternative
Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 72 (1995). As will be discussed in more detail
below, courts and arbitrators have placed certain restrictions on commissioners' seemingly unbridled authority.
Moreover, a league's constitution, bylaws, and/or collective bargaining agreement can also serve to limit the
commissioner's power. See Brian D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern 's Excessive Use of Rule-Making
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 205, 206 (2007).
41. See id. at 209. The NBA was known as the Basketball Association of America (BAA) at the time
Podoloff took office. See id.
42. The position at the time was titled "NBA President,", though it later became the NBA Commissioner in
1967. Mike Monroe, The Commissioners, NBA.coM, http://www.nba.com/history/commissioners.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010).
43. See Showalter, supra note 40, at 209. Nevertheless, Commissioner Podoloff was able to successfully
govern by using his influence to advance the league-most significantly, merging the BAA and the National
Basketball League to form the NBA. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. In addition to granting the Commissioner power to act in the best interest of the NBA, the owners gave
the Commissioner more authority to manage the league in ways he did not previously enjoy. Lockwood, supra note
23, at 149.
46. Lockwood, supra note 23, at 147.
47. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
48. Lockwood, supra note 23, at 147.
49. Id.
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This best interest power survives in the NBA today, 50 and allows the NBA
Commissioner to punish "any Player who, in [the Commissioner's] opinion, shall have been
guilty of conduct prejudicial.., or detrimental to the [NBA].",51 This authority permits the
NBA Commissioner to discipline players for their behavior off of the court. Moreover, the
Commissioner also has another source of supplemental authority that allows him to punish
players for off the field transgressions: the standard NBA player contract, which contains a
"good moral character" clause. 52 This clause permits the team to terminate a player's
contract if that player acts in a manner that is not consistent with the standards of good
morals and citizenship.5 3 The NBA Commissioner has also cited this clause in handing
down discipline for player misbehavior. 54 The best interest power and "good moral
character" clause have been described as granting the NBA Commissioner "the broadest
authority" among the commissioners of the major professional sports leagues. 55
Like the first NBA Commissioner, the first two NFL Commissioners did not enjoy the
expansive best interest power that MLB Commissioner Landis did.56 The NFL's third
Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, was granted significant authority, due in part to his
tremendous success in bringing financial solvency-and indeed, prosperity-to the
league.57 The owners gave Rozelle "full, complete, and final jurisdiction and authority over
any dispute involving a member or members in the League. 58 Rozelle could also punish a
player for conduct that he considered "detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence
in, the game of professional football.,, 59 Rozelle enjoyed this power without concerns of
arbitration rights afforded the player, which was (and is) the case in other professional
sports leagues.6 °
The NFL Commissioner today enjoys a great deal of authority to discipline a player
who acts in a manner that the Commissioner deems "to be detrimental to the League or
professional football.,, 6 1 However, an implicit limitation seems to exist within the NFL
50. It is worth noting that one significant change to the NBA commissioner's best interest power has been to
afford the players a grievance arbitration-a result that came about through the collective bargaining process. Id. at
161.
51. NBA CONST. & BYLAWS art. XXXV, § d. In addition, the NBA Commissioner "is entitled to promulgate
and enforce reasonable rules governing the conduct of players on the playing court" -which is very broadly
defined. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. VI, § 12, noted in Showalter, supra note 40, at 212-13.
The NBA Commissioner can implement such rules by merely giving notice and consulting with the NBPA; he does
not need to receive the organization's consent. In recent years, Commissioner David Stem has used this broad
authority to implement various rules intended to control players' behavior both on and off the court, such as a dress
code for players "engaged in team or league business" and prohibiting players from attending certain nightclubs.
Showalter, supra note 40, at 210-12.
52. Moser, supra note 14, at 75.
53. Bukowski, supra note 11, at 110.
54. See Mike Wise, Pro Basketball; Image Conscious NBA Suspends Iverson and Rider, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1997, at C8.
55. Showalter, supra note 40, at 212.
56. See Lockwood, supra note 23, at 146.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing NFL CONST. & BYLAWS art. VIII, § 8.3(a) (1988)).
59. Id. at 147 (citing NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XI, § 1(a) (1993)).
60. Id. at 147.
61. NFL CONST. & BYLAWS art. VIII, § E; see also NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. app. C, 15.
For an argument against the NFL Commissioner having the authority to punish players for their actions off of the
field under the NFL's various governing documents, see Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really
Any Different From Illegal Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains
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League Constitution, as Article VIII, Section 8.13(B) requires the NFL Commissioner to
secure the approval of the NFL Executive Committee in order to impose discipline beyond
his express authority. 62 Nevertheless, this otherwise broad grant of authority affords the
Commissioner great latitude in punishing players for transgressions-a power reinforced by
the NFL CBA and the NFL's standard player contract. 63 In addition, similar to those
powers afforded Rozelle, the NFL's current Commissioner, Roger Goodell, is not limited
by an arbitration provision the way other professional sports league commissioners are with
regard to their discipline and punishment of players. 64 Instead, players can only appeal the
Commissioner's disciplinary measures to the commissioner or his designee.65
Even though Goodell enjoys this distinction, he chose to collaborate with the NFL
Players' Association when developing the NFL Personal Conduct Policy (NFL PCP), 66
which grants him another supplemental source of authority for disciplining athletes. 67 The
NFL PCP provides that "[a]ll persons associated with the NFL are required to avoid
'conduct detrimental to the integrity and public confidence in the National Football
League.' 68 This type of detrimental conduct includes sexual offenses, domestic violence,
crimes related to steroids or other banned substances, dangerous activity that puts others'
safety at risk, possessing a weapon in a workplace setting, and "conduct that undermines or
puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the NFL., 69 In fact, a player acting in such a
Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 631, 638 (2009).
62. Michael A. Mahone, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the
National Football League's Revised Personal Conduct Policy, II VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 191 (2008); see
also Pachman, supra note 34, at 1418 (labeling this provision as a "significant departure" from the MLB
Commissioner).
63. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT app. C, 15, (permitting the NFL Commissioner to
punish an athlete who acts in a manner that is "detrimental to the League or professional football"); see also
Mahone, Jr., supra note 62, at 191-92.
64. See Lockwood, supra note 23, at 147.
65. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XI, §1 (stating that any discipline "may only be
affirmed, reduced, or vacated by the commissioner").
66. See NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2008), available at
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/Ruies--Regulations/Player-Policies/Conduct-Policy/ [hereinafter NFL PCP].
While a previous NFL PCP came into existence in 2000-when the owners unilaterally gave then-NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue the explicit authority to punish players for transgressions committed off the playing
field-Commissioner Tagliabue never exercised his authority under it. See Edelman, supra note 61, at 637.
Moreover, the new version of the NFL PCP includes "longer suspensions, indefinite suspensions, and even the
commissioner's right to suspend players for non-criminal behavior." See id. This difference, coupled with the
manner in which the current version of the NFL PCP came to being-that is, through Commissioner Goodell's
consultation with the NFLPA instead of being unilaterally imposed by the NFL owners-makes the new PCP
distinct (for purposes of this article) from the previous version.
67. Adam B. Marks, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players Association: How Union
Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union 's Members By Not Fighting the Enactment of the Personal
Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1584-85 (2008) (recounting the history of the development of the NFL
PCP). The NFL PCP replaced the NFL's Violent Crime Policy-instituted in 1998-which allowed the NFL
Commissioner to suspend and/or fine players charged with violent crimes. See Robert Ambrose, The NFL Makes It
Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1069, 1086-87 (2008). The NFL Violent Crime Policy also required a wayward player to
engage in counseling and a clinical evaluation. See Bukowski, supra note 11, at 110.
68. See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 66, at 1.
69. Id. at 2. Commissioner Goodell has suspended players under the NFL PCP for actions such as probation
violations, alleged involvement in dog fighting (which the player, Michael Vick, later pled guilty to related
criminal charges), and being the focus of a police investigation. See Marks, supra note 67, at 1583-84.
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manner will be found in violation of the NFL PCP, even if the player's actions do not result
in a criminal conviction.
70
While the NFL PCP provides the NFL Commissioner with an additional source of
authority for disciplining players for their misconduct, the document also contains a
proportionality requirement. 71 The NFL PCP provides that "[t]he specifics of the
disciplinary response will be based on the nature of the incident, the actual or threatened
risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional misconduct (whether or not
criminal charges are filed), and other relevant factors., 72 In this regard, whatever
punishment the NFL Commissioner imposes-which can include a fine, suspension,
banishment, counseling, or other education programs-must be proportional to the player's
actions.73 In addition, a disciplined athlete retains his right to appeal as provided in Article
XI of the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement and the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.74
Based on the best interest provisions contained in each league's constitution and
bylaws, and the other supplemental sources of authority, the NBA and NFL Commissioners
have broad authority to discipline players for their conduct off the court or field. However,
as discussed further in Part IV, while courts have given commissioners' actions great
deference, arbitrators have shown less deference in their treatment of commissioner
punishment.
IV. COURTS' AND ARBITRATORS' TREATMENT OF COMMISSIONER
PUNISHMENT OF ATHLETES
Given the broad power granted to commissioners under the professional sports
leagues' respective best interest clauses, it is instructive to analyze the treatment of their
powers by courts and arbitrators. Whether an athlete disciplined by the commissioner may
appeal to an arbitrator, court, or the commissioner himself depends upon which league he is
in. 75 Courts' treatment of commissioners' actions under the best interest clause of his
respective league's governing documents seems to continue the original intent of this
authority being plenary in nature.76 On the other hand, arbitrators have been far more likely
to reduce commissioner-imposed punishment-particularly based on a proportionality
standard-which limits the expansive best interest power of the commissioners.
70. See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 66, at 1.
71. Some scholars have challenged the validity and legal relevance of the NFL PCP, especially given its
uncertain relationship to the NFL's other governing documents. See Edelman, supra note 61, at 638; Marks, supra
note 67, at 1593-98. In particular, such critics cite the fact that the NFL PCP was not collectively bargained for,
and instead, was unilaterally implemented by Commissioner Goodell-though only after consulting with, and
receiving the support of, the NFLPA. See Marks, supra note 67, at 1581. However, to date, the NFL PCP has not
been successfully challenged, and Commissioner Goodell has acted consistent with the analysis of his powers
under the document as described above. Nor has the NFLPA taken any action when its players were fined or
suspended. See id. at 1584-85.
72. NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 66, at 2.
73. See id.
74. See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 66, at 3. Of course, a player's right of appeal is to the
Commissioner, who is the person who issued the punishment in the first place.
75. See Pollack, supra note 38, at 1648-49 (discussing the differences in players' right of appeal in the major
professional sports leagues).
76. See Win. David Cornell, Sr., The Imperial Commissioner Landis and His Progeny: The Evolving Power
of Commissioners Over Players, 40 NEw ENG. L. REv. 769, 772 (2006).
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A. Deference to the Commissioner: The Court Cases
Most court cases involving commissioners' best interest powers do not involve a
commissioner using his best interest power to discipline an athlete for misbehavior off the
court or field. Nevertheless, those cases that have, and those cases involving the
commissioner exercising his best interest authority in other contexts, demonstrate the
likelihood that courts will continue to defer to, and uphold, discipline imposed by a
commissioner against wayward players.
B. The Commissioner Usually Prevails
Early in the history of the best interest clause in professional sports, the Milwaukee
American Association brought suit against MLB Commissioner Landis challenging his best
interest authority. 77 The dispute arose when the St. Louis Cardinals sent outfielder Fred
Barnett-after several reassignments and optionings-to Milwaukee of the minor league
American Association, while reserving the option to recall him back to the major league
team. 78 MLB rules mandated that teams had to first place a player on waivers-allowing
other clubs the opportunity to sign that player-before sending him down to the minor
leagues.79 However, an exemption existed for teams that had purchased a player outright
for two years; the team would not need to place a player on waivers before sending him
down to a minor league club.80 In this case, the minor league club located in Wichita Falls
had sold Barnett to St. Louis for $5,000--despite an offer of $10,000 from the Pittsburgh
Pirates. 8' Commissioner Landis investigated and found that while St. Louis owner Phil
Ball's ownership interest in the four teams that Barnett had been transferred back and forth
between did not violate the Major League Agreement, it did allow Ball to keep the two-year
waiver exemption on Bamett intact, thus keeping the player under his control and
subverting the spirit of the waiver rule. 82 Accordingly, Commissioner Landis exercised his
best interest authority by voiding Barnett's option to Milwaukee and requiring that Barnett
either be returned to St. Louis and remain on the team for at least one year, transferred to
another team not owned or controlled by St. Louis, or released unconditionally.83 Ball filed
suit claiming that Commissioner Landis did not have the authority to act in this manner.
The court held in favor of the Commissioner, noting that "the commissioner is given almost
unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a certain state of facts creates a
situation detrimental to the national game of baseball. 84 This early case set the precedent,
77. See Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. 11. 1931).
78. See id. at 299-300. Milwaukee and the other teams to which Barnett had been reassigned or optioned were
either owned or controlled by the St. Louis club. See id.
79. See Curtis, supra note 26, at 10.
80. See Milwaukee Am. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 301.
81. See id.at 300.
82. See id. at 302. The four clubs that Ball had an ownership interest in were located in St. Louis, Tulsa,
Wichita Falls, and Milwaukee.
83. Curtis, supra note 26, at 11.
84. See Milwaukee Am. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 303. The court enumerated a variety of circumstances that fell
within the Commissioner's broad authority: "to keep the game of baseball clean, to promote clean competition, to
prevent collusive or fraudulent contracts, to protect players' rights, to furnish them with full opportunity to advance
in accord with their abilities and to prevent their deprival of such opportunities by subterfuge, covering or other
unfair conduct." Id.
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which has been followed by many subsequent courts, to give a high level of deference to
commissioner actions pursuant to the respective league's best interest clause. 85
A second instructive case did not involve the best interest clause-it predated the
inclusion of such a clause in the NBA's governing documents-but is nevertheless relevant,
as it demonstrates a similar deference to the NBA Commissioner to act in the best interests
of the sport even without such a clause. In Molinas v. NBA, 86 NBA President Podoloff
indefinitely suspended Jack Molinas for betting on his team, the Fort Wayne Pistons. 87
Molinas filed suit seeking an injunction to set aside his suspension and allow him to
continue playing in the NBA.88 Molinas claimed that he was not given notice and a hearing
before being suspended and that the NBA President had no authority suspend him
indefinitely.89 The court upheld Podoloff's actions, explaining that the elimination of
gambling from the NBA was an important justification for imposing such a punishment. 90
In Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,9' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals afforded
MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn a similar level of deference to that given Commissioner
Landis in Milwaukee American Association. In the case, Oakland Athletics owner Charles
Finley had attempted to sell the contracts of Vida Blue, Rollie Fingers, and Joe Rudi-all-
star players that the team could not afford to resign when their contracts expired at the end
of the season. 92 Citing his best interest authority, Commissioner Kuhn blocked the sale of
these players' contracts. 93 Commissioner Kuhn reasoned that allowing the sale of such
contracts to stand would jeopardize the integrity of the game and the public's confidence in
it. 94 The court upheld Commissioner Kuhn's denial of the attempted sale of the players'
contracts, relying on the best interest clause. In particular, the court noted that the MLB
Commissioner "has been given broad power in unambiguous language," and traced the
amendments to the Major League Agreement to demonstrate that this broad authority is
what the owners intended. 95
Finally, the court in Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn 96 again
afforded the MLB Commissioner great deference in acting pursuant to his best interest
powers. In the case, San Francisco Giants star outfielder Gary Matthews was planning to
become a free agent when his contract expired at the end of the 1976 season. 97 At the time,
85. This case was in stark contrast to precedent predating Commissioner Landis's tenure. For example, in
American League Baseball Club of N.Y v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919), the court held that the
three-person governing entity of the league-the National Commission--did not have the power to discipline a
player for breaking his contract with a team because the player's actions were not in the performance of his duties.
See id. at 501-02. In reading the National Commission's powers so narrowly, the court limited the scope of the
disciplinary power of the governing entity of the league to only those actions that players took on the field. See id.
at 504.
86. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
87. Id. at 242.
88. Id.
89. See Jeffrey Standen, The Beauty of Bets: Wagers as Compensation for Professional Athletes, 42
WILLAMET-rE L. REv. 639, 645 n.30 (2006).
90. Molinas, 190 F.Supp. at 244.
91. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
92. See id. at 530-31.
93. Seeid. at 531.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 534.
96. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
97. Lewis Kurlantzick, The Tampering Prohibition and Agreements Between American and Foreign Sports
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the team who most recently had a player under contract retained exclusive rights to
negotiate with that player. 98 On October 20, 1976, Atlanta Braves owner Ted Turner made
a comment to San Francisco Giants owner Bob Lurie-in front of several members of the
media-that he "would do anything to get Gary Matthews and that he would go as high as
he had to.' 99 These comments then appeared in the next day's newspaper in San Francisco,
and Lurie filed a complaint with MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn shortly thereafter.100
Commissioner Kuhn determined that Turner was violating MLB's tampering rules and
suspended him for one year. 10' Turner filed suit seeking to enjoin the Commissioner from
taking such action.'0 2 The court upheld Commissioner Kuhn's actions, finding "ample
authority to punish plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best interests of
baseball."' 1 3 The court in this case, as those before it, recognized an almost unbridled
power that flowed to the Commissioner through the best interest clause and accorded the
Commissioner great deference in acting pursuant to it.
C. Cases Where the Commissioner Failed
However, not all court cases have demonstrated this type of deferential treatment of
commissioners' exercise of their best interest powers. For example, in Riko Enterprises,
Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp.,104 the court held that the NBA Commissioner did not
have the authority to penalize a team for violating the NBA constitution by transferring the
team's draft pick that year to another team.' 05 In the case, the then-Seattle Supersonics
10 6
negotiated a contract with former NBA player John Brisker, who had previously been
playing in the rival American Basketball Association (ABA) despite the fact that the
Philadelphia 76ers owned his sole negotiating rights. 107 The NBA Commissioner found that
the Supersonics had violated the NBA constitution-specifically, the "simple principle of
fair play"-fined them $10,000, and gave the team's first round draft pick to the 76ers.'
0 8
The Commissioner pointed to his best interest power in justifying this punishment.' 0 9
However, the court disagreed, finding that the Commissioner had exceeded his authority by
forcing the Supersonics to forfeit their draft pick. 110 The court held that only the NBA's
Leagues, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS, 271, 290-91 (2009).
98. Id. at 291.
99. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. at 1217.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1218.
103. Id. at 1220.
104. 357 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
105. See id. at 525.
106. In 2008, after a dispute with the City of Seattle, the owner of the Seattle Supersonics moved to
Oklahoma City and the team became known as the Oklahoma City Thunder. See Greg Johns & Angela Galloway,
Sonics are Oklahoma-Bound, SEAVrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 3, 2008,
http://www.seattlepi.com/basketball/369313_trial03.html.
107. See Riko, 357 F. Supp. at 522. Although they were a rival league at the time, the ABA later merged with
the NBA. See Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited:
Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 771 n.180 (1987).
108. See Riko, 357 F. Supp. at 523.
109. See id. at 525.
110. See id. at 524-25. The court also seemed displeased by the Commissioner's refusal to conduct a hearing
to allow the Supersonics an opportunity to address the charges against them-this was particularly egregious in the
court's mind, given that the Commissioner was acting as arbitrator for the dispute. See Celeste M. Hammond, The
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board of directors had the authority under the NBA's constitution to impose the punishment
of denying a team their draft pick."' In this regard, the court found that the
Commissioner's best interest authority was not as expansive as other courts, discussed
above, had determined.
Another case that stands out as not following the deferential line of cases described
above is Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, Ltd. 112 In the case,
the San Antonio Spurs had attempted to purchase the contract of star player George Gervin
from the Virginia Squires for $225,000.113 The ABA Commissioner refused to allow the
sale, pointing to ABA bylaws that allowed the Commissioner to arbitrate and settle disputes
between league clubs related to player contracts. 114 The court acknowledged that while the
Commissioner had the authority to settle disputes between clubs, no dispute existed in this
matter, since the clubs were in agreement on the terms of the sale of Gervin's contract. 15
The court thus held that the Commissioner's authority did not extend to disputes that were
created by the Commissioner himself, as was the case here. 116 The court also rejected the
Commissioner's reliance on his best interest power because he took action without
providing notice and a hearing. 1
7
The case of Pete Rose also provides an interesting example of when a court has ruled
against a commissioner's best interest power. In 1989, after receiving information about
Rose's alleged gambling-including on MLB games-Commissioner Bart Giamatti
instructed his chief investigator to look into, and report on, the allegations. "18 Based on his
chief investigator's report that Rose had indeed bet on MILB games, Commissioner
Giamatti told Rose that Giamatti himself would investigate the allegations based on his best
interest authority and scheduled a hearing to discuss the investigation. 119 Rose demanded
that Commissioner Giamatti recuse himself, alleging that the Commissioner had already
prejudged his guilt. 120 When the Commissioner refused to do so, Rose filed suit seeking to
enjoin against Commissioner Giamatti from holding the hearing. 121 The court granted Rose
a temporary injunction-delaying MLB's ability to hold a hearing for at least a few
weeks-on the basis that the Commissioner had prejudged Rose. 122 While Commissioner
Giamatti and Rose agreed to a resolution of their dispute-where the Commissioner
suspended Rose for life but allowed him to be eligible to apply for reinstatement after one
year, and in turn, Rose dropped his lawsuits against the Commissioner-the case
demonstrated another situation where a court ruled against a commissioner despite his
acting pursuant to the best interest clause. 123
(Pre) (As) Sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and
Expectations of Transactional Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 589, 593-94 (2003).
Ill. See Riko, 357 F. Supp. at 525.
112. 373 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
113. See id. at 948.
114. See id. at 949.
115. See Mitchell Nathanson, The Sovereign Nation of Baseball: Why Federal Law Does Not Apply to
"America's Game" and How It Got That Way, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 82-83 (2009).
116. See Prof l Sports, 373 F. Supp. at 950.
117. See id. at 951.
118. See Curtis, supra note 26, at 27.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 27-28.
123. See id. at 28.
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Finally, the Chicago National League Ball Club v. Vincent 124 case is also
demonstrative of courts' refusal' to grant deference to a commissioner when his actions
exceed the scope of his authority. In the case, the MLB owners voted 10-2 in favor of
correcting certain geography issues that had arisen over the decades of MILB expansion and
team relocations by realigning four teams in the National League- 125 Under the realignment
plan-, the Chicago Cubs and St. Louis Cardinals would move from the National League
Eastern Division to the National League Western Division, and the Atlanta Braves and the
Cincinnati Reds from the National League Western Division to the National, League Eastern
Division. 126 However, the Chicago Cubs exercised their veto right under the MvLB
Constitution to block the realignment.127 MLB Commissioner Fay Vincent stepped in and
unilaterally decided to realign some of the teams in, the National, League, including moving
the Cubs to the National League Western, Division. 128 The Cubs filed suit seeking an
injunction against the Commissioner's realignment plan, and the court granted the
injunction. 129 The court noted that the Commissioner's best interest power, though,
expansive, was limited by Article VII of the Major League Agreement, which provided an
express means for resolution with regard to the voting provisions in the National League
Constitution. 130 Soon after the parties settled the dispute, Commissioner Vincent resigned
under pressure from the owners..3
These cases demonstrate that while some. courts are willing to give commissioners
great deference when they act according to their best interest powers, others will overturn
commissioners' actions if they exceed the scope of their authority. This theme is even more
prevalent in the arbitration decisions involving commissioner actions pursuant to their best
interest power.
D. Limitations on Commissioners' Power: The Arbitration Decisions
Commissioners have not been afforded the same level of deference by arbitrators that
they have by the courts. The Steve Howe case is illustrative. MILB Commissioner Vincent
suspended the oft-troubled Steve Howe for life when he entered an Alford plea to charges
of possessing and attempting to purchase cocaine--constituting his seventh recreational
drug violation since he began his professional baseball career. 132 Howe had been suspended
for each of his previous violations and had even avoided a lifetime suspension on his sixth
offense when Commissioner Vincent-who replaced Commissioner Kuhn-reinstated
Howe under rigid conditions that focused on Howe attending an ongoing drug rehabilitation
124. No. 92-C-4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 1033 (N.D. Il1. July 23, 1992), excerpted in PAUL C. WEILER &
GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 1, 28-32 (2004), withdrawn and vacated, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14948
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1992) (after the parties agreed to settle the dispute).
125. See Murray Chass, Newly Empowered Owners Rescind Order to Realign, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1992,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/25/sports/baseball-newly-empowered-owners-rescind-order-to-
realign.html?pagewanted=l.
126. See id.
127. See Curtis, supra note 26, at 29-30.
128. See Michael J. Willisch, Protecting the "Owners" of Baseball: A Governance Structure to Maintain the
Integrity of the Game and Guard the Principals' Money Investment, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619, 1621-22 (1994).
129. See Lydia Lavelle, From the Diamonds to the Courts: Major League Baseball v. the Commissioner, 21
N.C. CENT. L.J. 97, 114-17 (1995).
130. Id. at 115-16.
131. See Depak Sathy, Reconstruction: Baseball's New Future, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27, 61 (1994).
132. See Pollack, supra note 38, at 1692-93.
VOL. 11.2
HeinOnline  -- 11 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 194 2009-2010
COMMISSIONER'S AUTHORITY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
program. 133 The Players' Association, on behalf of Howe, filed a grievance with the MLB
arbitrator challenging Howe's lifetime suspension after his seventh offense.' 34 The
arbitrator reduced Howe's punishment to a one year suspension and a strict drug-testing
program, stating that the severity of Commissioner Vincent's discipline was "without just
cause."135 The arbitrator recognized the importance of keeping illegal drugs out of the sport
of baseball, but he also found that Commissioner Vincent's actions went beyond the
reasonable range of discretion given the Commissioner regarding drug offenses. 136 This
was particularly so, reasoned the arbitrator, given that he viewed the punishment as
exceeding the severity of Howe's drug violations, especially factoring in Howe's history of
mental illness.' 37 This proportionality theme has arisen in several arbitration decisions
involving commissioner action pursuant to the best interest clause and serves as a distinct
limitation to that power, at least in the arbitration forum.
Arbitrators in the NBA have also treated the commissioner's decisions with less
deference than courts have. For example, then-Golden State Warriors star Latrell Sprewell
assaulted coach P.J. Carlesimo during practice on December 1, 1997, and was suspended by
NBA Commissioner Stem for one year. 38 Sprewell appealed the Commissioner's
punishment to an arbitrator, who reduced the suspension from eighty-two games-one full
season-to sixty-eight games (the remainder of that NBA season).' 39 In explaining his
decision, the arbitrator pointed to the proportionality theme discussed above. He stated that
the year-long suspension exceeded the seriousness of Sprewell's ill-advised action; thus,
the punishment did not match the transgression when viewed in light of the
circumstances. 4o In this regard, though the reduction was not that significant-less than
twenty percent of the original punishment meted out by Commissioner Stem-the case
marked yet another instance of an arbitrator affording a commissioner less deference in the
exercise of his best interest power.
Finally, the case involving former MLB pitcher John Rocker offers an example of an
arbitrator considering the MLB Commissioner's disciplining of a player for actions
committed off the field, pursuant to his best interest power. 141 As part of his feud with New
York baseball fans, Rocker made racist, homophobic, and other insensitive comments to a
Sports Illustrated reporter. 14 2 MLB Commissioner Bud Selig responded with a series of
disciplinary measures: suspending Rocker from the beginning of MLB's 2000 spring
training through games played up until May 1, 2000; mandating that Rocker pay $20,000 to
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or another
133. See id.
134. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Comm'r of Major League Baseball (Steve Howe
Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2000 VOL. 1,
at 579, 582-83 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-591, 2000).
135. Id. at 583.
136. See id. at 626, 631.
137. See id. at 626-31.
138. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n ex rel. Sprewell v. Warriors Basketball Club, in UNDERSTANDING
BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2000 VOL. 1, at 469, 481-82 (PLI Intellectual Prop.,
Course Handbook Series No. G-591, 2000).
139. ld. at 574.
140. See id.
141. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Comm'r of Baseball (John Rocker Arbitration Decision) in
UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2001 VOL. 1, at 765 (PLI Intellectual
Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-638, 2001).
142. See id. at 769.
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organization devoted to promoting diversity; and requiring Rocker to attend a diversity
sensitivity and training program. 143 The Players' Association, on behalf of Rocker, filed a
grievance with the MLB arbitrator challenging Commissioner Selig's punishment. 144
Despite Rocker's protestations, the arbitrator recognized the Commissioner's authority-
through the best interest clause-to punish a player for actions the athlete committed off the
field that were speech-related and concerned non-criminal behavior. 145 The arbitrator,
however, did not find the Commissioner's best interest power to be unlimited. Instead, the
arbitrator stated that while the Commissioner has a "reasonable range of discretion," the
punishment dispensed must be on par with the offense committed, considering the
circumstances involved. 146 Given this standard, the arbitrator found Rocker's punishment to
be excessive and reduced Rocker's suspension to fourteen games and his fine to $500. 147 In
particular, the arbitrator noted that precedent in the Commissioner's punishment of
wayward players made Rocker's punishment stand out. In the past, the Commissioner had
imposed discipline equal to or greater than Rocker's only in cases of repeat drug offenders
committing additional, serious drug violations. 148 Recognizing this context, the arbitrator
found no convincing explanation as to why Rocker's punishment should rise to the same
level and thus held that the punishment did not meet the requisite proportionality
requirement. 149
These cases demonstrate that commissioners have not fared as well in arbitration as
they have in the courts, with regard to having their actions taken pursuant to their respective
best interest clause-in particular, disciplinary measures-upheld on appeal. However,
though less deferential, these cases still show that commissioners have broad best interest
powers to discipline athletes for their misbehavior off the court or field. This still
significant, though not unlimited, power becomes even more relevant for the NBPA and the
NFLPA when considered in light of the protections it receives through the collective
bargaining process.
E. The Collective Bargaining Process and the Power of the Commissioner
As one scholar notes, "[w]hile the constitution of a league may purport to give its
commissioner unlimited authority to impose discipline, that authority may be curtailed or
subject to outside review as a result of the collective bargaining process and provisions
incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement."'' 5 0 Indeed, "[w]hile the League
Constitution will provide helpful guidance in interpreting the commissioner's authority, the
CBA is the 'supreme governing authority' concerning employment" in professional sports
leagues. 151 These observations underscore the importance of the collective bargaining
process in defining the parameters of the commissioner power-including the power to
143. See id. at 770. Rocker was required to fulfill all aspects of the punishment before he would be allowed to
play again.
144. See id. at 769.
145. See id. at 802-03.
146. See id. at 804.
147. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, supra note 141, at 805-06. The arbitrator did, however, leave
the diversity sensitivity and training program requirement intact.
148. See id. at 805.
149. See id.
150. Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 171-72 (1995).
151. Mahone, Jr., supra note 62, at 192.
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discipline players. Moreover, this importance is only amplified given the special legal
protections provided CBAs, as described further below.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides for the collective bargaining
process that allows the respective leagues' owners and players' unions to negotiate the rules
and regulations of the relationship between the two sides. 152 In the seminal case American
League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Ass'n of National Baseball League Umpires,153 the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) established its jurisdiction over professional
sports leagues. 154 Despite a string of cases holding that MLB was not engaged in interstate
commerce, 155 the NLRB held that Congress intended for the NLRA to apply to MLB. 15 6 In
doing so, the NLRB applied the NLRA to professional sports, allowing players to unionize
and the players' union to negotiate the terms of employment and other related subjects for
their members through the collective bargaining process. 157
Due to this case, certain requirements of the collective bargaining process must be met
to protect the validity of the resultant CBA, and indeed, the longevity and strength of
professional sports leagues. For example, the substance of the negotiations between the
respective league and the players' union must include certain mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, including hours, wages, and working conditions. 15 8 For professional
sports leagues, the power of the commissioner is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. 159 Disciplinary measures and grievance procedures are also mandatory subjects
152. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (originally enacted in 1935); see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) ("to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to . . . confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment").
153. Am. League of Prof l Baseball Clubs v. Ass'n of Nat'l Baseball League Umpires, 180 NLRB 190
(1969).
154. See id. at 191.
155. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922);
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
156. See Am. League of Prof l Baseball Clubs, 180 NLRB at 191. Indeed, the NLRB scoffed at this notion,
originally established in Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., and subsequently upheld on stare decisis grounds
in Toolson and Flood. In this regard, the NLRB acted in a manner consistent with what the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged was the case, but which it refused to establish by overturning precedent. See Joshua M. Kimura, The
Return of the Natural: How the Federal Government Can Ensure that Roy Hobbs Outlasts Barry Bonds in Major
League Baseball, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 111, 135 (2009). However, the Supreme Court had previously held that other
professional sports were engaged in interstate commerce. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445,
451-52 (1957). Interestingly, before that decision, the NFL had refused to bargain with the NFLPA; when faced
with the threat of an antitrust lawsuit after Radovich, the league started negotiating with the NFLPA through
collective bargaining. See Marks, supra note 67, at 1587.
157. Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap Systems, 10
SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 191-92 (2003). Like other employee unions, players' unions are established when (1) the
union can demonstrate a substantial allegiance among the players; (2) the union petitions the NLRB to hold a secret
ballot election; and (3) if the union garners a majority of the players' votes, the NLRB certifies the union as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all of the players. See Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card
Check Agreements and the Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589, 1589 (2008). As the exclusive representative
of the players, the union has a duty of fair representation that ensures the union represents all of its members
"fairly, impartially, and in good faith." See Stiglitz, supra note 150, at 173 (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944)).
158. Michael J. Redding & Daniel R. Peterson, Third and Long: The Issues Facing the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effects of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 95, 98
(2009).
159. See Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. L. REv.
1048, 1061 (1996) [hereinafter Out of Bounds]. Other mandatory subjects for collective bargaining in professional
sports include free agency, the draft, salary caps, grievances, club discipline, the standard players' contract, base
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in a typical professional sports league's CBA. 160 If the league or the players' union refuses
to negotiate on a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, or if the commissioner
unilaterally implements a mandatory subject, such circumstances constitute a violation of
the duty to collectively bargain and results in an unfair labor practice., 6' However, a
commissioner can make unilateral changes that do not affect the "wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment."'' 62 Both sides are also required to negotiate in good faith. 
163
Finally, the collective bargaining must be conducted through bona fide, arms-length
negotiations. 164 Assuming these requirements are met, and the two sides can reach an
agreement, this negotiation process usually leads to a finalized CBA.1
65
The CBA is significant for numerous reasons, generally and specifically to
professional sports leagues and the power of a commissioner. More generally, CBAs-and
the included terms and conditions of employment--enjoy special protection from antitrust
laws. As one scholar has noted, "[t]here is an inherent conflict between labor laws and
antitrust laws."' 16 6 Labor laws aim to further collective bargaining and agreement between
unions and multi-employer bargaining units.' 67 Labor laws seek this process because of an
underlying belief that without collective action-through unionization and collective
bargaining-workers will be unable to obtain fair market value for their services.
61
Therefore, labor law statutes "were enacted to enable collective action by union members to
achieve wage levels that are higher than would be available on the free market."' 69 On the
other hand, antitrust laws prohibit restraint on trade or commerce, including in labor
markets, because of the underlying belief that collusion among competing businesses
creates pricing and market conditions that hurt consumers. 170
salaries, and other related topics. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, From Clarrett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor
Exemption Argument Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63, 72 (2007) (surveying some of the mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining); see generally Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DiSp. RESOL. 267 (2008)
(providing an overview of some of the key terms of collective bargaining in professional sports). There are also
non-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining that the two sides can choose to discuss and whether or not to
negotiate. See James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law II." Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and the Deep Agenda of
the Obama NLRB, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 653, 681 (2009).
160. See Stiglitz, supra note 150, at 168-69.
161. See Showalter, supra note 40, at 218.
162. Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution and Mechanics of
Commissioner Authority, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 32 (2008) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)).
163. Walter T. Champion, Jr., "Mixed Metaphors, " Revisionist History and Post-Hypnotic Suggestions on
the Interpretation of Sports Antitrust Exemptions: The Second Circuit's Use in Clarett of a Piazza-like "Innovative
Reinterpretation of Supreme Court Dogma ", 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 67 (2009).
164. See Jeffrey Hoffineyer, Fourth Down and an Appeal: The Nonstatutory Exemption to Antitrust Law in
Clarett v. National Football League, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 193, 199 (2006).
165. See George T. Stieful, II, Comment, Hard Ball, Soft Law in MLB: Who Died and Made WADA the
Boss?, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2008).
166. Sean W.L. Alford, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination of NFL Players' Most Powerful Weapon in
an Antitrust Lawsuit Against the NFL, 88 N.C.L. REV. 212, 223 (2009).
167. See id.
168. See Michael C. Harper, Multiemployer Bargaining, Antitrust Laws, and Team Sports: The Contingent
Choice ofa Broad Exemption, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1663, 1692 (1997).
169. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 253 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. See Harper, supra note 168, at 1692; see also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) ("[e]very
contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal"); Marc
Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and "Free Movements" Risks of Expanding US. Professional Sports Leagues
Into Europe, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 403, 413-15 (2009) (describing antitrust laws related to labor restraints).
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Tension arises between these two areas of law as multi-employer bargaining
oftentimes involves all of the employers for a specific group of workers, thus restraining the
workers' ability to negotiate for employment in the free market. 171 Due to this conflict,
courts and legislatures have developed both statutory and nonstatutory exemptions that
prevent courts from applying antitrust laws to the collective bargaining process and any
resultant CBA. 172 In this regard, these exemptions protect labor laws from the wrath of
antitrust regulation, thus favoring the policy goals of labor laws-specifically, allowing
collective action in the form of collective bargaining to achieve better wages for workers in
that field than individuals in the free market might garner. 173 The most relevant exemption
for professional sports leagues is the nonstatutory exemption. For the nonstatutory
exemption to apply, a court must apply a three-prong test. First, the restraint that would
otherwise violate antitrust laws must "primarily affect[] only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship."' 174 Second, the restraint must involve a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. 175 Finally, the collective bargaining-including the restraint at
issue-must have been accomplished through arms-length bargaining. 176 Assuming that all
three parts of the test are met, the restraint at issue will be exempt from antitrust laws.
All professional sports leagues, except MLB, fall within the scope of antitrust laws. 177
Given that a commissioner's disciplining of an athlete-which can include fines,
suspensions, or even banishment from the league-affects the demand for the player's
services and could potentially have significant economic effects on the player,
commissioner punishment of players constitutes a restraint that would otherwise violate
antitrust laws. 178 However, because the commissioner's best interest authority-and other
sources of authority such as the standard player's contract-affects only those parties in the
collective bargaining relationship (that is, the players and owners), commissioner
punishment handed out pursuant to this best interest power qualifies for the nonstatutory
exemption and thus is immune to antitrust laws. 1
79
The significance of the CBA can also be seen through its role as the definitive
governing document regarding the terms and conditions of players' employment. Because
of the CBA's hallowed status, the league cannot unilaterally change its terms and
conditions without engaging in the collective bargaining process. 180 In this regard, when the
power of the commissioner is limited or curtailed through the CBA, it cannot be unilaterally
expanded without engaging in collective bargaining. Though not specifically involving the
171. See Alford, supra note 166, at 223.
172. See id. at 223-24.
173. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (1976).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 703, 705 (1977); see also Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 200 (establishing MLB's antitrust
exemption); Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356 (upholding MLB's antitrust exemption); Flood, 407 U.S. at 258 (upholding
MLB's antitrust exemption); Radovich, 352 U.S. at 447 (holding that professional sports leagues, other than MLB,
were engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore, were not exempt from antitrust laws).
178. See Weistart, supra note 177, at 705-06.
179. See Out of Bounds, supra note 159, at 1061-62. But see Edelman, supra note 61, at 641-57 (analyzing
whether the NFL PCP violates antitrust laws because it was not explicitly part of the collective bargaining process).
180. See Stiglitz, supra note 150, at 173. However, as noted above, the commissioner-or a league's
owners--can make unilateral changes that do not involve the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See
Daniels & Brooks, supra note 162, at 32.
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CBA in each case, the Riko Enterprises, Inc., Professional Sports, Ltd., and Chicago
National League Baseball Club cases discussed above provide pointed examples where
courts have held that the commissioner's powers were limited by other provisions in the
governing documents, and therefore the commissioner had over-stepped his authority by
acting in the manner he did.
Two cases from the NFL provide examples that involve courts holding that a
commissioner exceeded his authority based on the limiting provisions contained in the
CBA. In National Football League Players Ass 'n v. National Labor Relations Board,181
NFL owners sought to unilaterally implement a new rule that automatically fined a player
for leaving the bench area during a fight on the field. 182 The court held that the owners'
promulgation and implementation of the rule constituted an unfair labor practice in
violation of the NLRA because it was a unilateral change to the CBA. 183 In the second case,
Commissioner Rozelle, acting pursuant to his best interest authority, sought to unilaterally
implement a new drug testing program that included random drug-testing.1 84 In the case,
while the arbitrator ruled that the Commissioner retained broad authority under the best
interest power, he noted that the NFL CBA's Article XXXI limited the Commissioner's
authority because it precluded all random drug-testing. 185  The arbitrator thus barred
Commissioner Rozelle from implementing the new drug testing program because it had not
been part of the collective bargaining process, thus constituting a change in the terms and
conditions of employment. 1
86
These cases demonstrate that courts and arbitrators will rule against a commissioner-
even when he is acting under his best interest authority-when their actions exceed the
limitations put on the commissioner's authority, as set forth in the CBA or another
governing document. In this regard, the stakes become ever-greater for the NBPA and
NFLPA with respect to their respective upcoming CBA renegotiations and the possibility of
liming the commissioner's power to punish players for misbehavior off the court or field
during the period covered by the new CBA.
F. Implications for the Upcoming CBA Renegotiations
Given the legal protections provided the power of the commissioner to discipline in
the CBA, the NBPA and NFLPA may focus some of their renegotiation efforts on
amending the commissioner's power. There are several reasons why the unions may do
so-some more obvious than others. On the obvious side, as commissioners increase the
severity of their punishments for transgressions committed off the court or field, offending
players lose more and more money due to fines and the loss of salary that accompanies
suspensions.187 Since most professional athletes have a very limited window of time to
181. 503 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1974).
182. Id. at 13.
183. See id. at 17.
184. See Ethan Lock, The Legality Under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by National Football
League Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1987).
185. See Mark M. Rabuano, An Examination of Drug-Testing as a Mandatory Subject of Collective
Bargaining in Major League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439, 450-51 (2002).
186. See David J. Sisson & Brian D. Trexell, The National Football League's Substance Abuse Policy: Is
Further Conflict Between Players and Management Inevitable?, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 8-9 (1991).
187. See Marks, supra note 67, at 1597 (noting that Adam "Pacman" Jones lost $1.3 million in salary to
suspensions, while Chris Henry lost more than $200,000).
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make significant salaries playing their sport, the incidence of more severe punishments
handed down by the commissioner erodes a base of earnings that many professional players
depend upon for life after their athletic careers. It is understandable, then, why many
players may push their unions to limit this broad commissioner power.
Another obvious reason why these unions may negotiate with the leagues over the
power of the commissioner to discipline is the persistent question of whether a league-
through its commissioner-should punish athletes for actions taken off of the court or field.
This questions breaks down into two key subparts or sub-questions. First, is it appropriate
for leagues to punish players for criminal acts committed off of the court or field before the
player has been found guilty in a court of law? 188 As detailed above, a commissioner's
authority to punish is not constrained by the need for a guilty plea or verdict in a court of
law; the commissioner can punish a player for his actions off the court or field that he
believes are not in the best interest of the sport. 189 However, this approach runs afoul of our
societal notions of innocent until proven guilty. Those concerns, of course, are mitigated by
the fact that professional sports leagues are voluntary, private organizations whose terms
and conditions of employment are set through collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the
players may push their unions to negotiate to amend the commissioner's power due to this
concern.
The second sub-question is whether leagues should be disciplining athletes for non-
criminal behavior committed off the court or field. As detailed above, former players John
Rocker and Dennis Rodman, and former coach John Calipari were suspended and/or fined
for making racially insensitive comments to the media. While ill-advised, such comments
did not violate any laws. However, under each commissioner's best interest authority, the
MLB Commissioner-in the case of Rocker-and the NBA Commissioner-in the cases of
Rodman and Calipari-handed down punishment in response. As one scholar has noted,
"[t]here is a real risk that the definition of proper conduct will be drawn so narrowly as to
infringe upon the political, religious, or social prerogatives of the players."'190 Some have
even viewed commissioners' disciplining of athletes for misbehavior off the court or field
in a much more nefarious light, suggesting that there is "evidence of a conscious effort to
truncate player autonomy under the guise of social authority.' 191 In addition to facing
potential discipline for non-criminal acts, players also face new rules that attempt to control
their personal actions. For example, in 2007, the NBA mandated that its players not visit
certain nightclubs that league security determined to be ill-suited for its players to attend.' 92
Players violating this policy are subject to a significant fine. 193 In this regard, players may
feel as though the league has too much control over their personal lives and may want that
aspect of the commissioner's power reigned in.
There are other less-obvious, but equally-important reasons why the players' unions
may push for reform in the area of a commissioner's power to punish. The first has to do
with procedure. In professional sports leagues, the commissioner--or his designee-
188. See Bukowski, supra note 11, at 111.
189. For example, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell suspended Cincinnati Bengals' wide receiver Chris
Henry after he was arrested four times, even though he was never convicted of any of the alleged crimes. See
Lockwood, supra note 23, at 164.
190. Weistart, supra note 177, at 722.
191. Lockwood, supra note 23, at 139; see also Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A
SituationalAnalysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819, 858 (2006).
192. See Showalter, supra note 40, at 212.
193. See id.
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investigates, conducts the hearing (if one is held at all), and imposes the punishment for
transgressions committed off of the court or field-with little oversight of the integrity of
the process or the decision. 194 Scholars have criticized this model of a commissioner sitting
as accuser, judge, and jury because it gives rise to perceived, if not real, bias. 195 Indeed, the
case involving Pete Rose and MLB Commissioner Bart Giamatti demonstrates this issue, as
the court granted Rose a temporary injunction because it determined that the Commissioner
had prejudged Rose's guilt.196 Moreover, without procedural protections or punishment
guidelines, this disciplinary approach lacks uniformity and consistency and may be riddled
with arbitrariness. 197 In this regard, players' unions may seek to provide more procedural
protections-most likely through grievance procedures-to protect players from perceived
or actual bias and inconsistency or arbitrariness in the current system.
Finally, players' unions may seek to negotiate on the power of their commissioner to
discipline wayward athletes in order to avoid the commissioner instituting the equivalent of
a personal conduct policy (PCP) in their league without it being collectively bargained.
While the NFLPA consulted with NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell regarding the NFL
PCP-indeed, they did agree to it-they have been roundly criticized for not insisting that
the policy be collectively bargained. 198 However, this collaboration between Commissioner
Goodell and the NFLPA could also be viewed as a harbinger of things to come with regard
to including such PCPs in the collective bargaining process. If such cooperation signals that
both the leagues and the players' unions understand the importance of addressing
misbehavior off of the court or field that creates public image problems for the league and
its players, then this may encourage both sides to reach agreement through collective
bargaining to address this increasing problem. In this regard, the NBPA and NFLPA may
have an incentive to work with their respective commissioners to include player conduct
policies in the CBA so that they will not face the commissioner unilaterally implementing
such a policy, and then be forced to sue over his authority to do so-on ground that it was
an unfair labor practice since it was not part of the CBA. Moreover, as detailed above, if a
PCP is a part of the CBA, then it will serve to limit the best interest power of the
commissioner to discipline players for transgressions committed off of the court or field. In
this regard, by incorporating a PCP-or more explicit limitations to the commissioners'
best interest authority to punish athletes-into the CBA, players' unions can protect against
this expansive power and provide for better, or at least clearer, parameters for such
punishment. 199
194. See Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 39, at 120.
195. Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Dernis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the Professional Sports
Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 127, 162-63 (1996).
196. See Curtis, supra note 26, at 27-28.
197. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 5, at 596; see also Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 39, at 120-2 1.
198. See generally Edelman, supra note 61, at 631; Mahone, Jr., supra note 62, at 181; Marks, supra note 67,
at 1581.
199. One other possibility may be for the NBPA and NFLPA to push for more disciplining to fall to the teams
instead of the league or the commissioner. While teams currently have some authority to impose disciplinary
measures on their players, the players' unions may have good reason to push for a shift from commissioner-
imposed punishment to more team-based disciplining. See Stiglitz, supra note 150, at 179-80 (discussing how
many believe that teams are far less likely to punish wayward players because they fear that such punishment will
provide a disincentive for free agents to sign with their team in the future). Understandably, a situation like this
where the power to discipline exists but is not often exercised-which is not currently the case with the
commissioner---may have great appeal to the players. However, one can imagine the reticence of commissioners
and owners to move to this type of disciplinary approach. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
These various impetuses for negotiating on, and perhaps altering, the power of the
commissioner to discipline wayward players for actions committed off the court or field
may or may not prove to be fruitful. Both leagues face difficult economic times, with drops
in league revenue and teams losing money, standing in stark contrast to the years of
significant economic growth that marked much of the past decade.2 °° In fact, due to the
economic recession and declining revenues, NBA Commissioner David Stem recently
proposed a rather controversial reduction in the percentage of revenues allocated to the
players in the new CBA: currently, the players receive 57% of basketball related income,20'
while Commissioner Stem proposed this become 45% under the new CBA.2 °2 This may
create a situation similar to what the NBPA faced in the 1960s and 1970s when its focus
was on providing economic gains for the players, rather than negotiating harder on other
employment-related matters such as the Commissioner's best interest authority.20 3 In this
regard, players' unions may need to use the issue of the power of the commissioner to
discipline as a bargaining chip with their respective leagues in order to gain the revenue
concessions that will likely be their top priority.
However, players' discontent with the current situation can only be resolved through
the collective bargaining process, for once a commissioner's power is ensconced in the
CBA, the players have little recourse to challenge the punishment-beyond whatever
grievance procedures are allowed pursuant to the CBA. If the players want to alter this
broad commissioner power to discipline-beyond the constraints of the proportionality
requirements imposed by arbitrators and any limitations set by the respective league's
governing documents-the renegotiations of the NBA's and NFL's CBAs provide a unique
opportunity to do so, at what many feel may be an appropriate or advantageous time.
200. See Ken Berger, Head Straight to Gate for Sign of Weakness in NBA Money Machine, CBSSPORTS.COM,
July 8, 2009, http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/l1934840 (noting that the NBA was expecting a drop of
between 2.5% and 5% in basketball related income for the league for the 2009-10 season); Brian Karpuk, Will
There Be An NBA Lockout in 2011?, NEws BURGALAR, June 3, 2009, http://newsburglar.com/2009/06/03/nba-
lockout-201 1/ (discussing rumors that more than half of NBA teams lost money in the 2008-09 season).
201. "Basketball Related Income" is defined as the aggregate operating revenues acquired by the NBA or one
of its subsidiaries. See NBA COLLECTIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. VII, § l(a), l(b).
202. Frank Hughes, NBA Expected to Take Hard Line in First Proposal to Union for New CBA,
SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Jan. 29, 2010,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/frank_hughes/01/29/labor.strife/index.html. In fact, Commissioner
Stem may also attempt to redefine what constitutes basketball related income. See id.
203. See Lockwood, supra note 23, at 149-50.
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